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Constructing a two-country oligopolistic model, this paper explores
another possibility of excess entry in open economies. The model
comprises two stages in which the government of each country chooses
the number of ¯rms in the ¯rst stage and the oligopolistic ¯rms play
a Cournot-Nash game in the second stage. We show that the number
of ¯rms determined in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this model
is larger than the socially optimal one, but smaller than that in the
free entry equilibrium. The implication of our result for coordinating
competition policies in the WTO forum is discussed.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing interest in `trade and the competition policy' in the
forum of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO meeting in
Singapore in 1996 decided to set up three working groups one of which deals
with the competition policy issue and is discussing how member countries
harmonize their policy. Despite these backgrounds, there are few studies
discussing competition policies in a globalized world.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework to ad-
dress the above question. To this end, we extend a theory of excess entry
in an oligopoly to a two-country model and compare three equilibria. The
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¯rst is a free entry equilibrium in which the number of oligopolists is de-
termined in such a way to satisfy the zero pro¯t condition. The second is
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the following two-stage game; each
country's government chooses its number of ¯rms in the ¯rst stage and
¯rms play a Cournot-Nash game in the second stage. And, the third is
a social optimum in which the number of ¯rms is calculated to maximize
the world welfare. We will show that the number of ¯rms in the second
equilibrium exceeds the counterpart in the third equilibrium while being
short of the one in the ¯rst equilibrium. That is, the noncooporative be-
havior of self-interested governments reduces the tendency toward excess
entry, but can not achieve the world optimum. This result might be a
rationale for the multilateral coordination of competition policies by the
WTO members.
It is helpful to mention the plausibility of the above subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. In a context of international pollution control, Dockner
and Long (1993) state that `¢ ¢ ¢ a Nash equilibrium need not be interpreted
as an equilibrium that arises in the absence of negotiation. In the context
of international pollution control, it may be more appropriate to think
of a Nash equilibrium as an outcome of negotiations on agreements that
are self-enforcing.' The same remark applies to our argument, namely, the
above subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be viewed as an outcome that
comes from the self-enforcing negotiations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model and derives
the free entry equilibrium. Section 3 solves a two-stage game consisting
of a policy game and Cournot-Nash competition and then compares the
resulting subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the free entry equilibrium.
Computing a world optimum, Section 4 compares it with the subgame
perfect equilibrium obtained in the preceding section. Section 5 gives a
¯nal remark.
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2 A Free Entry Equilibrium
A two-country (Home and Foreign), two-good (Goods 1 and 2), one-
factor (labor) model of oligopoly and increasing returns is constructed. The
world consists of Home and Foreign both of which produce an oligopolized
good (Good 1) and a competitive good (Good 2), which serves as a nu-
meraire. All the Foreign variables are distinguished by attaching an as-
terisk (*). Both goods are tradable while labor is not. Without loss of
generality, one unit of labor produces one unit of Good 2, from which the
wage rate is internationally unity.
On the other hand, production of good 1 is subject to increasing returns.
There are n ¸ 2 identical ¯rms in Home and n¤ ¸ 2 in Foreign. All ¯rms
have the same technology and the production function of a representative
¯rm, say, ¯rm i, is speci¯ed by
xi = l
®
i ; ® > 1:
It follows from this speci¯cation that not only the average cost but the
marginal cost is decreasing in outputs.
To de¯ne each ¯rm's pro¯t, we introduce the demand side. Assuming a
representative consumer in each country, Home's utility function is given
by
U = ° lnC1 + C2; ° > 0; (1)
which, after utility maximization, yields the demand function of each good:
C1 =
°
p
(2)
C2 = (national income)¡ °
= L+ n¼ ¡ °; (3)
where p denotes the relative price of Good 1 and ¼ the per-¯rm pro¯t in
Home.1) Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) yields Home's indirect utility
1) Note that L gives the labor income due to the unitary wage rate.
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function:
U = ° ln

°
p

+ L+ n¼ ¡ °
= ° ln ° ¡ ° ln p+ L+ n¼ ¡ °
= n¼ ¡ ° ln p+ °(ln ° ¡ 1) + L:
Since °(ln °¡1)+L is constant, we can ignore it from welfare components
and de¯ne Home's welfare as
V (p; n¼) ´ n¼ ¡ ° ln p: (4)
Foreign's counterpart is analogously de¯ned by
V (p; n¤¼¤) ´ n¤¼¤ ¡ ° ln p: (5)
The rest of this section will focus on a canonical case where the number of
¯rms is determined by the zero pro¯t condition as in Mankiw andWhinston
(1986). Because both countries share the identical preference, the market-
clearing condition of Good 1 under free trade is
°
p
+
°
p
=
X
xj +
X
x¤j ;
which yields the world inverse demand function:
p =
2°P
xj +
P
x¤j
: (6)
Noting that the cost function of Home's representative ¯rm becomes
x
1=®
i , the pro¯t of a representative ¯rm in Home and Foreign is de¯ned by
2°P
xj +
P
x¤j
xi ¡ x
1
®
i (7)
2°P
xj +
P
x¤j
x¤i ¡ x¤
1
®
i : (8)
Con¯ning attention to the interior maximum in a symmetric equilibrium,
each ¯rm's ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t maximization becomes2)
2) Throughout the paper, we assume away the possibility that a country specializes
to the competitive good.
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2°
nx+ n¤x¤

1¡ x
nx+ n¤x¤

¡ 1
®
x
1
®
¡1 = 0 (9)
2°
nx+ n¤x¤

1¡ x
¤
nx+ n¤x¤

¡ 1
®
x¤
1
®
¡1 = 0: (10)
Solving (9) and (10) for x and x¤ yields a symmetric Cournot-Nash equi-
librium output:
x = x¤ = xE =

2®°(N ¡ 1)
N2
®
; (11)
where superscript E refers to the Nash equilibrium and N ´ n + n¤.
Substitution of (11) into (7) gives the maximized pro¯t of each ¯rm:
¼E ´ 2°
NxE
xE ¡

xE
 1
®
=
2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N2
: (12)
Throughout the paper, an interior maximum has been assumed, for which
we need to impose:
Assumption. N · ®
®¡1 .
This section is closed by deriving the number of ¯rms in the free entry
equilibrium. Setting (12) to zero, we have
NE =
®
®¡ 1 ;
or equivalently
nE =
®
2(®¡ 1) =
1
4
+
®+ 1
4(®¡ 1) : (13)
3 Strategic Competition Policy
In the preceding section, the world equilibrium under free entry is charac-
terized. Alternatively, this section considers an equilibrium of a two-stage
game in which each country's government determines the number of its
¯rms in the ¯rst stage and then each ¯rm plays a quantity-setting game,
taking the predetermined number of ¯rms as given. This section is devoted
to characterizing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this two-stage
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game.
Since the second stage has already been solved in the previous section,
we concentrate on the ¯rst stage. To do so, we begin by de¯ning each gov-
ernment's payo® function. Substituting (11) into (6), the Nash equilibrium
price becomes
pE ´ 2°
NxE
=
(2°)1¡®
®®
N2®¡1(N ¡ 1)¡®: (14)
Hence, further substitution of (12) and (14) into (4) yields the objective
function of the Home government:
V
 
pE ; n¼E

= n¼E ¡ ° ln pE
= n
2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N2
¡ ° ln

(2°)1¡®
®®
N2®¡1(N ¡ 1)¡®

= n
2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N2
¡ °(2®¡ 1) lnN + ®° ln(N ¡ 1)¡ ° ln

21¡®°
®®

:
Because the last term in the right-hand side above is constant, we can
rede¯ne Home's objective function as
W (n; n¤) ´ n2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N2
¡ °(2®¡ 1) lnN + ®° ln(N ¡ 1): (15)
In the same manner, Foreign's counterpart is de¯ned by3)
W (n¤; n) ´ n¤ 2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N2
¡ °(2®¡ 1) lnN + ®° ln(N ¡ 1): (16)
The Home government maximizes (15) and the Foreign government (16),
taking the other country's number of ¯rms as given. Then, Home's ¯rst-
order condition for welfare maximization is4)
2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N2
+ 2°n
(1¡ ®)N ¡ 2[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N3
¡ °(2®¡ 1)
N
+
®°
N ¡ 1 = 0:
Eqs. (15) and (16) allow us to ¯nd that both countries choose the same
number of ¯rms in the equilibrium, namely, n = n¤. Accordingly, the
optimal number of n is obtained by setting N = 2n in this ¯rst-order
condition:
3) Note that both countries have the same function W (¢).
4) It is possible to show the second-order condition for maximization.
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2n(1¡ ®) + ®
2n2
+
n(®¡ 1)¡ ®
2n2
¡ 2®¡ 1
2n
+
®
2n¡ 1 = 0;
which gives the number of ¯rms in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
nF =
3®¡ 2
4(®¡ 1) =
1
4
+
2®¡ 1
4(®¡ 1) ; (17)
where superscript F stands for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Now that we ¯nd two equilibrium values of the number of ¯rms, nE and
nF , we readily compare them. The result is stated in:
Proposition 1. nE > nF , i.e., the number of ¯rms in the free entry
equilibrium is larger than that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the competition game.
Proof. The di®erence between nF and nF is
nF ¡ nE = 2®¡ 1
4(®¡ 1) ¡
®+ 1
4(®¡ 1)
=
®¡ 2
4(®¡ 1) < 0;
due to the assumption of ® 2 (1; 2). Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 claims that the number of ¯rms is reduced by taking into
account the strategic interdependence between the countries. The intu-
ition behind this result is as follows. In the policy game considered, each
government determines the number of ¯rms such that it maximizes its so-
cial utility including consumer welfare (consumer surplus). This care for
consumer welfare leaves the number of ¯rms less than that in the free entry
equilibrium.
4 A Second Excess Entry Theorem
This section compares the socially optimal number of ¯rms with the
number of ¯rms in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium found in the last
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section. For this purpose, let us calculate the social optimum. We de¯ne
the `social optimum' as the solution that maximizes the joint welfare of
Home and Foreign. The world welfare is simply de¯ned by the sum of
both countries' welfare:5)
W (n; n¤) +W (n¤; n) =
2°[N(1¡ ®) + ®]
N
¡ 2°(2®¡ 1) lnN + 2®° ln(N ¡ 1):
Since this is a function of N only, we need not compute the ¯rst-order con-
dition with respect to n and n¤ separately. Maximizing the world welfare
with respect to N yields6)
NS =
1
2
+
s
5®¡ 1
4(®¡ 1) ;
where superscript S represents the social optimum. Noting that each coun-
try's number of ¯rms is just a half of N leads to
nS =
NS
2
=
1
4
+
s
5®¡ 1
16(®¡ 1) : (18)
It may be constructive to mention that nS can also be obtained by
considering the Nash bargaining problem between the countries. That is,
we can verify that nS is alternatively obtained by maximizing the Nash
product: h
W (n; n¤)¡WF
i h
W (n¤; n)¡WF
i
;
where WF stands for each country's welfare attained in the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium, which is assumed to serve as a disagreement point.
Based on (17) and (18), we can prove:
Proposition 2. nF > nS, i.e., the number of ¯rms in the subgame perfect
5) Due to the quasi-linearity of preferences, summation of both countries' welfare
entails no serious problem. Uekawa (1994) also employs the sum of welfare as the
world welfare in a context of strategic trade policy.
6) The second-order condition is also satis¯ed since W (n; n¤) +W (n¤; n) is strictly
concave in N .
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Nash equilibrium of the competition policy game exceeds the socially opti-
mal one.
Proof. Subtracting nF from nS , we establish that
nS ¡ nF =
s
5®¡ 1
4(®¡ 1) ¡
2®¡ 1
4(®¡ 1) < 0;
for any ® 2 (1; 2). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 provides a relevant policy implication for the international
harmonization of competition policies. It asserts that the noncooporative
choice of the number of ¯rms leads to another possibility of excess entry
although the resulting world welfare is higher than under free entry. Thus,
each country calls for a worldwide harmonization of competition policies
in the international forum, e.g., the WTO. In other words, our result sheds
light on the need for the coordination of competition policies in the WTO
round talks.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has sought another possibility of excess entry in an oligopolis-
tic market by constructing the following two-stage game model. The two
countries' government seeks to maximize welfare by controlling its number
of ¯rms in the ¯rst stage and each oligopolist plays a Cournot-Nash game
in the second stage. In this setting, we have shown a unique ranking among
the number of ¯rms in the free entry equilibrium
 
nE

, subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium
 
nF

, and socially optimal equilibrium
 
nS

such that
nE > nF > nS holds. This result immediately appeals a need for inter-
national coordination of competition policies since noncooperative policy-
making of self-interested governments can not achieve the world optimum.
That is, our conclusion provides a rationale for the cooperation among the
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WTO participants on competition policy coordination.
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